The Critical Oversight

The FIA has candidly acknowledged a significant oversight in Formula One’s 2022-2025 ground effect regulations, with single-seater director Nikolas Tombazis admitting the governing body underestimated the critical importance of ride height. The admission comes as the sport closes the chapter on a four-year era marked by porpoising problems, driver discomfort, and high-profile disqualifications.

In a frank assessment following the conclusion of the 2025 season, Tombazis revealed that both the FIA and teams failed to anticipate how low optimal ride heights would become under the new regulations.

« The fact that the optimum [ride height] of the cars moved so much lower was a miss in the 2022 regulations, » Tombazis stated. « It’s something that we missed—and not only us but also the teams. In all discussions, nobody raised that issue. It was something that became obvious very, very close to the start of the championship, when it was too late to change the regulations. »

The oversight had far-reaching consequences. To extract maximum performance from ground effect aerodynamics, teams were forced to run their cars extremely low and stiff, creating a cascade of technical and safety challenges that defined the entire regulatory cycle.

The Porpoising Problem

The most visible consequence of the ride height oversight was porpoising—the violent bouncing that plagued many teams, particularly in 2022. The phenomenon occurs when ground effect aerodynamics pull the car too close to the track surface, causing the airflow to stall and the car to rise. As the car rises, the aerodynamics reactivate, pulling it back down, creating a continuous cycle of violent vertical oscillation.

While Mercedes suffered the worst porpoising effects, with Lewis Hamilton reporting « a lot more bruising » and « headaches » that raised concerns about micro-concussions, virtually every team experienced the problem to some degree. Pierre Gasly memorably warned he’d need a cane by age 30 if the bouncing continued.

The FIA implemented Technical Directive 39 at the 2022 Belgian Grand Prix, introducing a vertical oscillation metric to force teams to address the issue. However, the underlying problem—cars optimized for extremely low ride heights—persisted throughout the four-year cycle.

Even in 2025, drivers continued to complain about physical discomfort. Max Verstappen remarked after Las Vegas that « my whole back is falling apart, » illustrating that while the extreme porpoising of 2022 had improved, the fundamental issue never fully disappeared.

Plank Wear Complications

The drive for ever-lower ride heights created another major issue: excessive plank wear. Teams pushing the limits to gain performance found themselves navigating a dangerous line between speed and legality.

High-profile disqualifications resulted from this arms race. The 2023 United States Grand Prix saw penalties for plank violations, while McLaren faced scrutiny during the 2025 Las Vegas weekend. Ferrari also encountered plank-related disqualifications in 2025, highlighting how the ride height sensitivity created a minefield for teams.

Why Wasn’t It Anticipated?

Tombazis emphasized that the oversight occurred during the design phase and wasn’t caught by teams or the governing body during pre-implementation discussions.

This timing proved critical. By the time the true implications of ride height sensitivity became apparent, the 2022 season was essentially locked in. Teams had designed and built their cars to the existing regulations, and wholesale changes were impractical.

Some suggested that stricter suspension regulations might have mitigated the extreme ride height requirements. However, Tombazis rejected this notion: « We don’t believe that suspension changes would have had a first-order effect. It would perhaps have given them a [different] set of options, but we don’t think the simplification of the suspension rules would have had a first-order effect. »

The Standardization Debate

The persistent challenges raised questions about whether greater standardization could have prevented these issues. Tombazis acknowledged this perspective but warned against oversimplification.

« Please don’t take this single phrase without my complete thought, but all of these problems would go away the more we go towards a standard car, » he conceded. « You can easily have a Formula 2 car with a bit more performance, and then you don’t have porpoising, you don’t have any loopholes, and you don’t have any plank issues. »

However, he emphasized the fundamental tension in Formula One regulation: « You can solve all of these things with more prescription. But clearly, we want Formula 1 to be a technological battle as well. »

« We want Formula 1 to be a technological battle as well. You can solve all of these things with more prescription, but at what cost? »

Looking Ahead to 2026

The FIA believes lessons learned from the ground effect era have informed the 2026 regulations, which feature significant aerodynamic changes designed to avoid repeating the ride height mistakes.

« We believe it is very unlikely to have similar characteristics because of a much flatter floor, » Tombazis explained. « How much the downforce increases as you go lower is not as pronounced with this car as it was in last year’s car. We believe that will reduce the chance of porpoising. »

These changes aim to push teams toward running cars higher off the ground, where porpoising is less likely and plank wear becomes less critical. The reduced emphasis on ground effect means the aerodynamic penalty for raising the car should be smaller than in the 2022-2025 era.

Cautious Optimism

Despite confidence in the new regulations, the FIA isn’t declaring victory prematurely. Recent experience has taught them that unintended consequences can emerge once cars hit the track.

« When the cars run for the very first time and have some issue, I wouldn’t exclude it, » Tombazis admitted. « But I would say that the rules are inherently less in that direction. So given the teams did a pretty good job of solving the issue with the previous generation of cars, it should be a much easier problem next time. »

This measured approach reflects the FIA’s recognition that regulatory oversight can only go so far. Teams will inevitably find ways to exploit the regulations that the governing body hasn’t anticipated, and some consequences only become apparent through actual racing.

The Grading

When asked to assess the 2022-2025 regulatory cycle overall, Tombazis offered a modest evaluation:

« I certainly wouldn’t claim total success on everything—I wouldn’t give us an A star. I would give us a B or a C or something like that, but I think we moved in the right direction, » Tombazis stated.

This self-assessment acknowledges both progress and shortcomings. The financial regulations successfully introduced cost controls. Close racing improved initially. However, the ride height oversight, porpoising problems, plank wear complications, and the return of dirty air issues prevented the era from achieving its full potential.

Lessons for Future Regulation

The candid admission from the FIA serves as a valuable lesson in motorsport regulation. Even with extensive consultation, simulation, and planning, real-world implementation can reveal unforeseen problems.

The ride height oversight particularly demonstrates how interconnected regulatory effects can be. What seemed like a straightforward implementation of ground effect aerodynamics created cascading consequences: porpoising, driver discomfort, plank wear issues, and enforcement challenges.

The Path Forward

As Formula One transitions to the 2026 regulations, the FIA carries forward both confidence and caution. The flatter floor design should inherently reduce porpoising risks, but the governing body recognizes that certainty is impossible until cars actually race.

The admission of the ride height oversight represents a mature approach to regulation—acknowledging mistakes rather than defending them, learning from experience, and applying those lessons to future rule-making.

For teams, the 2026 regulations offer a fresh start without the ride height sensitivity that defined the previous era. Whether this translates to more comfortable racing for drivers and fewer technical headaches for teams remains to be seen when the cars first take to the track.

The ground effect era of 2022-2025 will be remembered for its ambitions and its complications. The FIA’s frank assessment ensures that the lessons learned won’t be forgotten as Formula One enters its next technical chapter.